By the Kripkean argument, only the reassembled ship has any claim to being the original ship, \(O\)
If we grant that \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship, we seem esatto have a solution onesto the ship of Theseus paradox. But this success is short lived. For we are left with the following additional paradox: Suppose that \(S\) eventuates from \(O\) by replacing one part of \(O\) one day at per time. There seems onesto be widespread agreement that replacing just one part of per thing by per new exactly similar part preserves the identity of the thing. It follows that either the Kripkean argument is incorrect, or replacement of even a scapolo part (or small portion) does not preserve identity (a view known as “mereological essentialism;” Chisholm 1973).
This can be seen (though it may already be clear) by considering a modified version of the ship of Theseus problem
As indicated, Kripke denies that his argument (for the necessity of origin) applies to the case of change over time: “The question whether the table could have changed into ice is irrelevant here” (1972, 1980). So the question whether \(O\) could change into \(S\) is supposedly “irrelevant.” But Kripke does not give a reason for this claim, and if cases of trans-temporal identity and trans-world identity differ markedly mediante relevant respects – respects relevant onesto Kripke’s argument for the necessity of origin, it is not obvious what they are. (But see Forbes 1985, and Lewis 1986, for colloque.) The argument above was simply that \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship since there is per possible world in which they differ. (閱讀全文…)